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REVIEW SECTION
LANDLORD AND TENANT IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN C. BRUTON *

Any law not based on reason must ultimately perish. 1
A hundred years ago or more, this state was largely agricultural. Hence, to prevent tenant farmers from. eviction just

prior to the harvesting of their crops in the fall, there became
firmly embedded in our law the rule which made certain
tenancies, where a termination date was not specified, annual
* 1%ember South Carolina Bar, Firm of Bruton & Bruton, Columbia, South Carolina.

1. "The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true
meaning of a law, when the -words are dubious, is by considering the
reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislature to enact
it. For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease
with it." I Cooley's Blackstone, pp. 55, 56 (4th Ed.)
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ones-running from January to December, both inclusive, of
each year.
Since the state is no longer predominantly agricultural,
the reason for this rule has vanished. Thus, in the spring of
1946 the legislature changed the rule to provide that tenancies
of unspecified duration should be monthly and not annual
ones.2 The new law, after providing for thirty days' notice of
termination of a monthly tenancy, says, ". . . provided, that
no tenancy shall ripen into a tenancy from year to year." S.
C. CODE, §8806-11 (Supp. 1946). Agricultural lands were
exempted from this law so that as to them the old rule of annual tenancies still exists. 3
Some criticisms of the bill were expressed on the ground
that it was helpful to landlords. 4 But such criticisms ignore the
true point of the change, which is that the reason for the annual tenancy rule is no longer applicable. In 1870 Judge
Willard of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in the important case of Coogan v. Parker,2 S. C. 255 (1870), in order
to show that a rule of common law was based on reason, drew
a distinction between the property leased and the subject matter of the lease. He said at page 275:
"It has long been felt that the application of the common law ought to yield results more in accordance with
the habits and ideas of the people ......
(This case is discussed more fully
The annual tenancy rule was thus
Old South. Aside from this, however,
act is of primary benefit to landlords

on page 145).
an outworn relic of the
any statement that the
overlooks the fact that

2. Act No. 873; 44 S. C. Stat. at Large, pp. 2584 eot seq., approved
April 3, 1946.
3. The new law repealed most of the provisions of the old law. It is
specifically not applicable to leases of timber, easements, property used
for electric power, telephone, telegraph, water or gas lines as well as
agricultural lands. The repeal and the exemptions from the new statute

leave few statutory provisions applicable to exempted contracts.
4. In voting against the bill, Representative Johnl D. Long said, "It
(the act) is another bill to help the rich at the expense of the poor and
defenseless." (1946 House Journalp. 1518.) It is true that a change from

annual tenancies to monthly tenancies helps landlords in times when

there is a "landlord's market"; however, when there are more places
for rent than there are renters such a change will benefit tenants, because the annual tenancy is as binding on tenants as on landlords.
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an annual tenancy so imposed was equally binding on the
landlord and on the tenant. Hart v. Finney & Jones, 1 Strob.
250 (1847). The court there said at page 254:
"It is a condition of such tenancy that neither party
can determine it before the end of the year; nor then
without reasonable notice; ... Godard v. Rail Road Co.,
2 Rich., 346. Whenever the tenant enters upon a new year,
he is bound for that year, and so on, as long as he may
occupy. Dod v. Monger, 6 Mod., 215; Martin v. Watts, 7
Term R., 83; 6 Term R., 296."
The purpose of the writer is to offer some reflections on
the statutory change and to review the subject generally.
APPLICATION

At the threshold of our discussion we must come to grips
with the question of the application of the new statute. All
situations where there is a question of application fall into
these three groups:
(1) Where the tenancy or lease was created and terminated prior to the enactment of the new statute but the litigation resulting therefrom arose afterwards.5 In this situation
it seems to be unanimously agreed that the new law does not
apply. Thus in Croft v. Faust, 209 S. C. 477, 40 S. E. 2d 80
(1947), the lease was made before the new law was enacted
but the litigation on eviction was begun afterwards, in the
summer of 1946. However, it was agreed by all parties that
the new law did not apply. The court said at page 481:
"We have determined the issues in this case without
reference to the terms of Act No. 873 of the Acts of the
5. In this state a distinction is made between tenancies, which imply
occupancy, and leases or agreements of tenancies, which do not require

occupancy, Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S. C. 251, 139 S. E. 614 (1927).
The court said at page 256:
"His honor inadvertently fell into two errors in his statements
in the order he made. He refers to the relationship between Simon
and Kirkpatrick as being that of 'landlord and tenant'; as a matter
of fact, Kirkpatrick, the lessee, never went into possession of the

premises, and notified Simon that he did not intend to do so; as a
matter of law, therefore, the relation was that of lessor and lessee,
under a written contract of lease."
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General Assembly, 44 St. at L., page 2584. The parties
apparently concede that their rights are governed by the
law as it existed prior to the passage of the above Act."
(2) Where the tenancy was created after the enactment.
Here, if it is clear that the agreement of tenancy was made
subsequent to the enactment of the statute, that law would
unquestionably apply. However, this is not true where the
"new" agreement of tenancy is made pursuant to an option
in an old agreement, or under a lease provision that the tenancy continues unless notice of termination be given. By the
law of this state such a provision is a continuance of the original lease until the term as so extended is ended. Hampton
Park Terrace v. Sottile, 102 S. C. 372, 86 S. E. 1066 (1915).
An option to renew continues the old agreement even though
the rent is not provided for. Rainwater v. Hobeika, 208 S. C.
433, 38 S. E. 2d 495 (1946). Thus if the original agreement
was made prior to April 3, 1946, the time of enactment of the
new statute, the old law continues applicable so long as the
original agreement continues by automatic extensions or by
renewals pursuant to option.
(3) Where the tenancy was created prior to the enactment
of the statute but not terminated prior thereto. It is elementary that a law in effect at the time of the making of a lease
continues until the termination thereof. Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827); McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How.
608 (U. S. 1843); Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1933). This, of course, would apply
to leases made before the date of the new law even where occupancy occurs later. An agreement cannot be changed by
subsequent legislation if it purports to deprive the party of a
vested interest. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.
518 (U. S. 1816). Legislation which must be interpreted to
apply to existing relationships or agreements, and to cut off
or impair existing right or obligation is unconstitutional.
First Presbyterian Church of York v. York Depository, 203
S. C. 410, 27 S. E. 2d 573 (1943), at page 423:
...
I do not think a retroactive provision would be
valid which affected vested interest in property."

We must then assume that the statute will not be construed to be retroactive. Therefore an annual tenancy in ef-
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fect prior to April 3, 1946, would be subject to the old law
until the tenancy was terminated. Termination, it would seem,
is automatic if "reasonable notice" is given. On April 3, 1946,
the statute was enacted which expressly says that "no tenancy
shall ripen into a tenancy from year to year". This was certainly "notice," and it would also be "reasonable" since it was
enacted almost nine months prior to December 31, 1946. (The
tenant could obviously have had no vested interest in a continuance after that time, since the tenancy could be terminated
by reasonable notice).
However, the question may properly be raised as to whether
the statute could give "notice" if the tenancy was a prolongation of the original lease, and not a new lease for the calendar year. While the statement is frequently made judicially
and otherwise that the annual tenancy continues from year to
year unless reasonable notice of termination is given, the
actual decisions would seem to indicate that, without reasonable notice, a new tenancy is created on January 1 of each
year. See Maynard v. Campbell, 115 S. C. 226, 105 S. E. 351
(1920) ; McNulty v. Windham, 182 S. C. 462, 189 S. E. 754
(1937). In Hampton ParkTerrace v. Sottile, supra, it was held
that a lease for one year, which would thereafter be continued
automatically unless notice of termination was given, had to
be written and recorded; since, until the termination notice
was given, it was merely a prolongation of the original lease
and as a result was a lease for more than one year. As the
annual tenancy is almost always oral and practically never
recorded, and since it was not an express exception to the
Statute of Frauds or to the statute requiring recordation, it
must be considered as only a one year's lease, beginning afresh
on each January 1. This being so the statute would operate
to notify all tenants under annual tenancies that at the conclusion of their present annual tenancy on December 31, 1946,
a continued occupancy by them would be from month to month
and not from year to year.
It might also be contended that since the tenant (in some
cases) was protected from evictions by the federal rent control law, the law cannot be changed as to him. It is true that
under that law a tenant would not be evicted (except for
certain stated reasons) during the continuance of that law.
However, upon notice an annual tenancy could be terminated
and the tenancy would become a statutory one, and the tenant
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would be entitled to retain possession only by reason of the
federal statute. Under these circumstances it has been held
that the tenant had no vested right thereto. Parkerv. Porter,
154 F. 2d 830 (Em. App. 1946). A tenant could be evicted
if the landlord proved that he wanted possession of the leased
property for his own, or his immediate family's occupancy.
Beaufort v. Rubin, 206 S. C. 293, 33 S. E. 2d 891 (1945);
Bruce v. Lynch, 210 S. C. 538, 43 S. E. 2d 477 (1947).
REPAIRS
In the absence of a covenant otherwise, it may be stated
generally that the landlord owes no duty to the tenant to keep
the premises in reasonable repair.6
Where there is no duty there could be no responsibility,
and therefore if the leased property becomes untenantable because of disrepair there could be no constructive eviction and
the tenant would remain liable for the rent.
A leading case in this state on the subject of the landlord's
6.

The clearest statement of the common law rule is found in the

North Carolina case of Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin,
156 N. C. 255, 72 S. E. 312 (1911). There the court said:
"Without express stipulation in a lease, the law implies a covenant
of quiet enjoyment upon the part of the landlord, and if the tenant
be rightfully evicted by another, he may recover damages, and this
covenant extends to water and sewage connections existing at date
of lease. Huggins v. Waters, 154 N. C. 444, 70 S. E. 842.
"Under the civil law, in case of tenancies for short terms, the

landlord was under implied obligation, without special agreement, to
keep the premises in repair. 4 Kent, Com. 110; Felton v. Cincinnati,
95 Fed. 336, 37 C. C. A. 88; Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U. S. 707,
7 Sup. Ct. 962, 30 L. Ed. 776. But under the common law it is well
settled that, in the absence of any agreement between the parties, the
landlord was under no obligation to his tenant to keep the demised
premises in repair.
"The common law considers such a lease as the one in evidence
as the grant of an estate for years, to which the lessee takes title.
The lessee is bound to pay the stipulated rent notwithstanding injury by flood, fire, or other external cause. It required a statute of
the state to relieve the lessee where the property is destroyed by
fire. By the common law the lessor is under no implied covenant
to repair, or even that the premises shall be fit for the purpose for
which they are rented. 3 Kent, Com. 465; Brown, Leg. Max. (3d Ed.)
213, 214; Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63; Doupe v. Genin, 45 N. Y. 119,
6 Am. Rep. 47; 2 McAdam on Landlord & Ten. §383; 1 Taylor on
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duty to repair in the absence of an express provision therefor
is Mallard v. Duke, 131 S. C. 175, 126 S.E. 525 (1925). There
an action was brought by the landlord to recover the balance
on rent due from the date of the tenant's surrender of the
premises to the end of the term of the lease, less the amount
received by the landlord from releting the premises during
such period. The tenant defended by claiming a rescission of

the lease based on the landlord's misrepresentations prior to
the completion of the building, the subject of the lease, and
that there was a constructive eviction. The court held that
there was no evidence to support the contention that the landlord had made misrepresentations as to the condition of the
completed building prior to the completion thereof; and, further, that any defect in the construction of the building had
been waived by the tenant's long occupancy, so that there
could not have been a constructive eviction. Moreover, the
Landlord & Ten. §327; Viterbo v. Friedlander, supra. Chancellor
Kent states the distinction between the civil and common law as
follows: 'The Roman law made some compensation to the lessee
for the shortness of his five-year lease, for it gave him a claim
upon the lessor for reimbursement for his reasonable improvements. The landlord was bound to repair, and the tenant was
discharged from the rent if he was prevented from reaping and
enjoying the crops by an extraordinary and unavoidable calamity, as tempests, fire, or enemies. In these respects the Roman
lessee had the advantage of the English tenant, for, if there be
no agreement or statute applicable to the case, the English landlord is not bound to repair, or to allow the tenant for repairs made
without his authority; and the tenant is bound to pay the rent, and
to repair at his own expense, to avoid the charge of permissive
waste.' 'The rule of caveat emptor applies to leases,' says the Encyclopaedia, 'and the landlord is not even under an implied obligation
to remedy defects in the demised premises existing at the time of the
demise. It follows therefore in the absence of any agreement on the
part of the landlord to repair, a tenant cannot recover from the
landlord the cost of repairs made by him,' etc. 18 Am. & Eng. p.
215. In regard to waterworks, it has been held in New York that,
when water pipes are arranged for an entire building occupied by
different tenants, it is the duty of the landlord to keep the pipes in
repair, or the failure to repair may amount to a constructive evictment. Bank v. Newton, 76 N. Y. 616. But the Massachusetts court
holds that a landlord is under no implied obligation to keep in repair
water pipes used exclusively in carrying water to the part of the
building demised to the tenant, and therefore is not liable to such
tenant for leakage from such pipes. McKeon v. Cutter, 156 Mass.
296, 31 N. E. 389."
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court said there was no implied obligation by the landlord
that he would keep the premises in repair or that the premises
would be suitable for the tenant's needs.
There is similarly no obligation on the part of the tenant
to keep the demised property in reasonable repair, except of
course that he may be responsible to the landlord for "permissive waste" if he permits the property to get in a serious
condition of disrepair7
,The failure of a landlord to repair, even where he has
covenanted to do so, may not be grounds for refusal by the
tenant to pay rent. A covenant to pay rent creates a fixed
liability and is a separate thing from the contingent liability
created by a covenant to repair. See Ripley v. Wightman, 4
McC. 447 (1828). Nor does the failure to repair give the tenant
grounds upon which to terminate and vacate unless the property has become so uninhabitable that there is a constructive
eviction. Mallard v. Duke, supra; see Rowland & Sons, Inc. v.
Bock, 150 S. C. 490, 148 S. E. 549 (1929).
Where the landlord has promised to repair but does not
do so, the tenant should either move or make the repair himself. But he is justified in moving only if the disrepair is
serious enough to amount to a constructive eviction. Mallard
v. Duke, supra.. If he makes the repair himself, he can recover
the expense of the repair in a separate action, or, possibly,
deduct it from the rent payable. In Cantrell v. Fowler, 32 S. C.
589, 10 S. E. 934 (1890), in a suit by the landlord to recover
rent in arrears, from the tenant, the defense was that the
landlord had covenanted to repair a leaking roof, and because
of the landlord's failure to do so the goods of the tenant had
been damaged and the tenant had been forced to move. A
direction to the jury was approved which said that under a
covenant to repair the landlord's failure to repair required
7. As a practical matter, the tenant for any length of time will keep
the property in reasonable repair since he is occupying the property and
presumably does not wish to let it get in a disreputable condition. This
also applies in the case of disrepair occasioned by outside force, other
than normal wear and tear. In other words, if a fire or a flood did damage to the demised property, there is no obligation on the part of the
landlord to repair the damage but the tenant remains liable for the
rent agreed upon, even though part of the premises is untenantable. This
seems somewhat unfair to the tenant as the rent, at least, should be
abated as to the part of the leased property which cannot be used by
the tenant.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss2/2
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the tenant either to move or to make the repair himself and
deduct it from the rent. Since the jury found for the landlord, evidently they found there was no oral covenant to re-pair.
But a breach by a landlord of an obligation to repair does
mot give rise in this state to a tort liability to the tenant, his
-familyor invitees. In Pendarvis v. Wcnnamaker, 173 S. C. 299,
175 S. E. 531 (1934), and in Timmons v. Williams Wood
Products Co., 164 S. C. 361, 162 S. E. 329 (1932), it was held
that neither the plaintiff-tenant nor his family could recover
for personal injuries sustained by reason of defects which
the landlord had promised to repair.
Some criticism can be leveled at these decisions on the
grounds that where an injury can reasonably be forseen if
the repair is not made, the landlord should be responsible
therefor so long as he has covenanted to make the repair. The
courts of this state, however, take the view that, if the landlord does not make the repair, the tenant should do so and
recover against the landlord, either by an action alleging
breach of contract or, if the tenant is willing to take a chance
on eviction, by deducting the expense of repair from the rent.8
Nevertheless, this state does enforce liability against a
While it has never been expressly held in this state that expense

8.

for repairs ordered by the tenant can be deducted from the rent payable,
some cases have said that this could be done, while others have said that
it could not be done. In the Timmons case supra the court expressly
stated that the tenant could "make repairs himself and deduct the expense thereof from the rent." The court said by way of dictum at page
374;
"Because the question for determination is one of novel impression
in this jurisdiction, this opinion has perhaps been unduly prolonged,
but a careful and exhaustive study convinces us that, with rare

exceptions, all of the cases which permit recovery for personal injuries to the tenant or to a member of his family are bottomed (1)

upon breach of a statutory duty; (2) where injury results from a
defective condition known to the landlord and concealed by him from
the tenant; (3) where injury is occasioned by a defect in a portion
of the premises reserved by the landlord for the common use of all

his tenants; (4) where injury occurs from the defective condition
of premises furnished by the landlord for use of the public generally,
as theaters, docks, etc.; (5) when the covenant is to keep the prem-

ises safe during the term; or (6) where the lessor actually undertakes to make the needed repairs and negligently does so--where
there is misfeasance as distinguished from nonfeasance."
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landlord where the injury is caused by the disrepair of prop-

erty under the landlord's control or dominion.9 In Binnicer
v. Adden, 204 S. C. 487, 30 S. E. 2d 142 (1944), the plaintiff
was injured by stepping in a hole in a cement walkway leading
to a grocery store which was owned by the defendants but
leased by them to others. Judge Gaston held that the action
could not be maintained since the owner-landlord was under no
duty to the tenant to repair the walk. On appeal this was reversed on the grounds that the evidence showed that the walk,
upon which the plaintiff was injured, was not part of the
leased property. The court said at page 491:
"The tenant alone might be liable for the negligent
repair alleged if the walkway in this case was included in
the rental agreement, but if the landlords retained control and possession of it, the complaint states a cause of
action against them. Such, in effect, was said by Acting

Associate Justice J. Henry Johnson in his excellent opin9. In this respect, this state follows the common law rule which is
generally accepted. In a leading W. Va. case, Charlow v. Blank nhip, 80
W. Va. 200, 92 S. E. 318 (1917) a tenant brought an action against a
landlord for damages resulting from the roof of the building leaking and
the tenant's goods, stored therein, being damaged by the water. The landlord contended that there was no responsibility on his part to repair, and
that there was no implied covenant that the property was suitable for
the purpose for which it was leased. The court confirmed this, but held
that the landlord had the exclusive control over the roof and that he
was obligated to keep it in repair. The court said:
"Because the injury is suffered by a party who is his tenant does
not relieve him from the obligation to pay the damages which restilt from his negligence. The tenant cannot prevent his landlord
from using the part of the premises of which he retains the control
as he pleases. He has no authority to go upon them and make any
repairs that may be needed to prevent injury to his property, and
to say that the landlord in such case is not liable for an injury
occasioned by the defective condition of that part of the property
remaining under his exclusive control, which he negligently refuses
to correct, would be to say that a landlord in a case like this may
ruin his tenant by his negligence without any obligation to make
reparation." (p. 320 S. E.)
"In Underhill on Landlord and Tenant, §485, it is said:
'It is a general rule that the landlord must keep in reasonable
repair those portions of the demised premises which he retains in
his possession and control. His obligation in this respect is not based
on contract, but arises from the responsibility of an owner of real
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ion for this court in Timmons v. Williams Corp., 164 S. C.
361, 162 S. E. 329, 333, as follows: 'Because possession
and control are reserved unto the lessor, the law implies
an obligation, creates a legal duty, to keep the same in repair, and to operate it properly. This is in accord with
the general rule that there is an implied duty on the part
of the landlord to keep in repair all portions of demised
premises of which he reserves possession and control for
the common use of several tenants, and is peculiarly applicable to halls, stairways, elevators, and other approaches
of which no particular tenant has exclusive possession
and control. 36 C. J., 212, 213."
It would be quite impracticable to require all repairs to
be made by the landlord. The landlord has no right to inspect
the demised property, nor has he the privilege of looking over
the leased property to determine what, if any, repairs should
be made at any given time. He has no control over the leased
property and is powerless to take steps which he may feel
should be taken to minimize the repairs that may be necessary.
Accordingly, most leases provide that repairs should be made
by the tenant, and that there shall be an abatement in rent
if any part of the demised premises are rendered uninhabitable by circumstances beyond the tenant's control. 10
estate to persons who, by his invitation expressed or implied, are
permitted to enter upon his property.'"
In Smithftie

Improvement Company v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N. C. 255,

72 S. E. 312 (1911), proceedings were brought by the landlord to evict
the tenant and recover unpaid rent. The defense was that the rent had
not been paid because the water pipes were broken. Judgment was
given for the defendant's (tenant) responsibility to keep the plumbing
in repair. In affirming the lower court the Supreme Court said:
"We have examined the written lease with care, and are unable
to find any covenant in it by which the landlord binds himself to
keep the property or the waterworks during the lease in repair.
Whether the tenant obligated himself to do it is immaterial." (p. 313
S. E.)
10. The usual lease provision requiring the landlord to repair fire
damage except for a total destruction, has never been interpreted by

the courts of this state; but in the recent case of Leone v. Russo, 76
N. Y. Sup. 2d 347 (1948), the fire clause in a lease provided for a termi-

nation of the lease in case of fire "if the damage is so extensive as to
amount practically to the total destruction of the leased premises or of
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Theoretically, this solution would appear satisfactory, but
some difficulties arise in the determination of a repair as distinct from an improvement. It is, of course, impossible to consider in this brief discussion all matters which may arise, but
in general it may be said that anything that does not change
or alter the existing improvements is a repair, and anything
else is an improvement. However, even if we follow this rule,
we obtain results that are wrong. For example, replacing a
roof on a structure is considered an improvement and not a
repair, although this certainly does not alter or change the
existing structure. In many instances it is purely a matter of
degree, and this question is a very difficult one to answer.
Aside from raising a problem in the case of landlord and
tenant, it is an acute question in taxation; in accounting by
trustees between life tenants and remaindermen; in public
utility, telephone, and railroad companies as to whether the
charge is a proper one to expenses or should be added to their
rate base.
IMPROVEMENTS, ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS

The Statute expressly forbids a tenant to "alter" the rented
structure without written permission. S. C. CODE, §8815
(1942). There is, of course, no statutory or other obligation
on the part of the tenant to make any additional improvements
on the demised premises. On the other hand, it is clear that if
the tenant does make any alteration or improvement, it would
the building." In all other cases, if the fire occurred without fault of the

tenant, the landlord was required to repair within a reasonable time, and,
if the premises were rendered untenantable to apportion the rent until
the premises were repaired. A fire having occurred which rendered the

premises untenantable, the tenant demanded that the landlord repair.
The landlord contended that the damages were so extensive as to terminate the lease. An action was brought for a declaratory judgment in
which the only issue was the construction of the fire clause and its application to the particular facts. The court held that the language used
was equivalent to the use of words "total destruction" and that in determining whether there was "total destruction," the rule to be followed
was that applied with respect to "total loss" in marine cases. That rule,
applied to the case of fire in a building is, that if the cost of restoration
of the building as it was immediately preceding the fire, is more than
one-half of the value of the building at the time of the fire, then there
is a "total destruction." Applying this rule to the facts in the case the
court held that there had not been a "total destruction", and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
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belong to the landlord at the termination of the tenancy. City
of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Club,
205 S. C. 495, 32 S. E. 2d 777 (1945). There the tenant erected
upon the leased property grandstands, bleachers, fences, poles,
reflectors and lights. Thereafter, with the consent of the landlord, the lease was assigned, and upon its termination, the
assignee claimed he was entitled to remove the additions under
the common law rule that while a lessee could not remove any
additions or improvements to leased property, he could remove, as an exception to the rule, trade fixtures. The court held
that the property in question was not trade fixtures and could
not be removed. In the opinion the court said at page 511:
"An important exception to the general rule of the
common law, that whatever is once annexed to the freehold becomes part of it and cannot afterward be removed
except by him who is entitled to the inheritance, exists
in the case of structures erected or chattels annexed for
the purpose of trade or manufacture. It has been said that
the underlying reason why property placed on leased
premises by the tenant for purposes of trade is regarded
as personal rather than real is based upon the rule that
the law implies an agreement that it shall remain personal property from the fact that the lessor contributed
nothing thereto and should not be enriched at the expense
of his tenant when it was placed upon the real estate of
the landlord with his consent. The question whether particular structures or articles are removable as trade fixtures depends solely upon whether they are designed for
the purpose of trade; and this turns on the intention
with which they were affixed to the realty; and not upon
the character or mode of the physical annexation to the
realty."
However, if the improvements add to the rental value of
the property, are made with the consent and knowledge of
the owner, and with no intention by the tenant to make a gift
of the improvements to the owner, the tenant may be entitled
to reimbursement. Coggins v. McKinney, 112 S. C. 270, 99 S.
E. 844 (1919).
WASTE

It is elementary that the tenant may not commit waste on
the demised premises and may not permit others to commit
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such waste. But as to what constitutes such waste, the law is
not as clear. Of course, any demolition of improvements on the
demised property would constitute waste, and probably removal of soil or manure, or cutting of timber, [Hill v. Burgess, 37 S. C. 604, 15 S. E. 963 (1892), Roberts v. Jones, 71
S. C. 404, 51 S. E. 240 (1905)], or any alteration or defacement of improvements. What one man thinks is an improvement, another man may think is a disfigurement. It is always
a good idea to leave leased property strictly alone unless the
landlord consents to the change.
DUTY OF TENANT TO PAY RENT

An option to renew the existing lease even where no rent
is agreed on, is nevertheless effective, as in Rainwater v.
Hobeika, 208 S. C. 433, 38 S. E. 2d 495 (1946).
The duty of the tenant to pay rent ends when the lease is
terminated by the landlord, or when the tenant is evicted by
the landlord. Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S. C. 251, 139 S. E.
614 (1927) ; See Mallard v. Duke, 131 S. C. 175, 126 S. E.
525 (1925) ; See Gentry v. Recreation, Inc., 192 S. C. 429, 7
S. E. 2d 63 (1940). If the landlord thereafter relets the demised property, he cannot hold the tenant for loss in rent, nor
is he required to pay the old tenant any increase in rent paid
by the new tenant over that which the old tenant contracts to
pay. Of course, if the lease provides for a continuation of the
tenant's obligations despite a default in rent payments, or if
the tenant abandons or surrenders the leased property and the
landlord relets for the old tenant's account and does not
terminate or cancel the lease, the old tenant remains responsible for any loss in rent, and he is entitled to any increase.1
In Simon v. Kirkpatrick,supra, the lessor in an agreement
of lease exercised an option thereunder and after two months
default in rent notified the defendant lessee who had never
gone into possession that he had no further "right or benefit
thereunder." At the time of this termination, three months
11. Where the landlord abrogates the lease and attempts to hold the
tenant for the rent until the end of the term, under the rule of mitigation of damages, he is required to make reasonable efforts to lease the

property at a fair rental. See Mallard v. Duke, 131 S. C. 175, 126 S. E.
525 (1925) ; See Gentry v. Recreation, Inc., 192 S. C. 429, 7 S. E. 2d 63
(1940).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss2/2

14

Bruton:
Landlord
and Tenant in South Carolina
REVIEW
SECTION

rent was due. Subsequently, the plaintiff (lessor) sued for
three months' rent, due at termination, and ten months' rent
thereafter accrued; but it was held that he could recover only
the rent due up to the date of termination. The court said at
page 262:
"The rule, as we understand it, is that the termination of a lease does not absolve the lessee from obligations incurred up to the date of termination, but it does
absolve him from future obligations, unless the lease shall
provide that, notwithstanding the termination for causes
by the lessor, the lessee shall not be relieved of such
future obligations. 36 C. J.335."
While many decisions have said, loosely, that a breach of
condition by the tenant terminates the lease, what is meant is
that such a breach gives the landlord the right to terminate.
In Simon v. Kirkpatrick, supra, the Court said at page 260:
"Eviction and re-entry by the lessor are not the only
methods of terminating a lease-an estate for years. It
may be determined by the expiration of the term, by the
surrender of the term by the lessee with the consent of
the lessor, by a merger of the term in the fee, or upon the
breach by the lessee of certain covenants or stipulations
in the lease, as upon the death of a certain person, or
the lessee's insolvency, or the non-payment of rent, and
many other causes; in any of which last-named events
the lessor has the right upon notice to terminate the lease.
See 1 Tiffany R. P., §52."
At common law, failure to pay the rent agreed upon, as
we have said, would not automatically terminate the lease, but
would give the lessor the option to terminate. That was true
in this state prior to the enactment of the new statute. However, S. C. CODE, §8806-12 (Supp. 1946) provides that the failure to pay rent shall automatically terminate any lease:

"FAILURE PAY RENT ON DEMAND. Failure to pay
the rent agreed upon when due, or a reasonable rent for
use and occupation when demanded shall terminate all
tenancies for term, for years, from month to month, and
at will; and the tenant shall forthwith vacate the premises without notice".
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This apparently absolute provision is somewhat modified by
a later section. Section 8806-14 of the new law provides:
"DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF RENT. Default in payment
of rent shall terminate any lease unless otherwise agreed

upon".

Apparently the "otherwise agreed upon" clause means such a
provision in the lease itself. Otherwise, it would apply only
after the default and would then be too late to avoid terminating the lease.
In Simon v. Kirkpatrick,supra, the major reason given for
releasing the lessee from further liability by reason of the
lessor's termination is that it would be unfair to hold the
lessee to a liability when he had no chance to protect himself
by subletting or occupying the leased premises, as stated thus
at page 261:
"If Simon [the lessor] thereafter [after termination]
had the undisturbed control of the lot, to place it in the
hands of a real estate man to sell or rent, which he did,
certainly, Kirkpatrick [the lessee] could not have had the
same right at the same time, and if Kirkpatrick had endeavored to protect himself against the liability sought
to be imposed by the plaintiff, he would have been powerless to do so. Is it fair, then, to Kirkpatrick, to hold him
to a liability against which he could not have protected
himself, and the consideration of which he had been withdrawn by Simon who was enjoying it for his own
benefit?"
Under this reasoning an automatic termination of the lease
would relieve the tenant from further liability under the lease.
It would seem therefore that under the statute a failure by
the lessee to pay rent would automatically terminate the lease
and relieve the tenant from further liability. However, it is
contrary to all recognized rules of contract law to permit a
breach of contract to relieve the defaulting party from the
liability for which he has contracted. Thus it is likely that
S. C. CODE, §8806-12 (Supp. 1946) and 8806-14, supra, will
be interpreted to give the landlord the option to terminate
rather than that the failure to pay rent will automatically
terminate.
A somewhat similar problem arises from the abandonment
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of the premises by the tenant. S. C. CODE, §8806-47 (Supp.
1946) provides:
"When a tenant abandons premises theretofore occupied by him the landlord may enter and take possession
thereof, making distraint, as herein provided of any
property found thereon, including the property exempt
from distress by the provisions of section 8806-34; and
the term of a tenant abandoning premises used and occupied by him as such shall be deemed ended by such
abandonment, absence from the property for fifteen days
after default in the payment of rent shall be construed as
abandonment."
Normally abandonment of property by the tenant would
give the landlord an option to terminate, but by not so terminating he could continue to hold the tenant for any rent due
until the end of the term. However, the above section seems
to call for an automatic termination or abandonment which
would relieve the tenant of further obligation to pay the rent.
As in the case of a default in the payment of rent, it is felt
that the provision will be interpreted to give the landlord an
option to terminate.
SUBLETTING

There is no statutory or other legal restriction on the right
tenant to sublet the premises or assign the lease therethe
of
for. A distinction must be made between subletting the premises and assigning the lease. A sublet is a release by the tenant
of only a portion of his term, but an assignment of the lease
conveys the full term of the tenant's right to the property
leased.
The statute, however, does provide that any assignment of
the lease or subletting of the property shall be of no effect as
against the landlord, and the original tenant remains liable
to the landlord. S. C. CODE, §8806-44 (Supp. 1946). There is
also absolute freedom on the part of the tenant to use the
demised property for any purpose he desires, so long as its
'use does not offend the criminal laws or is not a use restrainable in any other manner. This is necessarily tied in closely
with the freedom to assign the lease or sublet the property,
since a restriction on the use would considerably restrict the
freedom to assign the lease or to sublet the property. Also the
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provision as to use is important in this state, since the court
-will permit cancellation of the lease by the tenant if the use,
as distinguished from the property leased, is destroyed by
enemy or act of God. This subject is discussed fully at page
145, infra.
Of course, if the property is sublet or the lease assigned,
the landlord, as a practical matter, loses one of the remedies
available to him for collection of past due rent, which is the
right to distrain against the tenant's property in or on the
leased premises. Since the sublease is wholly ineffective as far
as the landlord is concerned, he would not have the right to
distrain against property of a subtenant with whom he has no
contractual relation ship. The landlord, of course, would retain his remedy of ejectment; and, therefore, unless the tenant
pays the rent due and also complies with all of the other covenants between them, the landlord would have the right to
terminate the tenancy and eject the subtenant, even though
the subtenant has breached no covenant and owes no rent to
his landlord, who is the original'landlord's tenant.
THE NECESSITY OF WRITING

The question of the legal effect of an oral lease has presented some interesting questions. The statute now provides:
"A tenancy for not to exceed one year may be created
by oral agreement". S. C. CODE, §8806-5 (Supp. 1946).
"Any agreement for the use or occupation of real
estate for more than one year shall be void unless in writing". S. C. CODE, §8806-6 (Supp. 1946).
The statute of frauds also is applicable and, in so far as it is
pertinent here, provides:
"All estates, interests of freehold, or terms of years,
or any uncertain interests of, in, to, or out of any lands,
tenements, or hereditaments, made or created by livery
and seizin only, or by parol, and not put in writing and
signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or
their agents thereunto lawfully authorized, by writing,
shall have the force and effect of estates at will only, and
shall not, either in law or equity, be deemed or taken to
have any other or greater force or effect; any consideration for making any such parol leases or estates, or any
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former law or usage, to the contrary notwithstanding,
except leases not exceeding the term of one year from the
time of entry... " S. C. CODE, §7042 (1942).
Prior to the 1946 law, the statute provided: "No parol lease
shall give a tenant a right of possession for a longer term
than twelve months from the time of entering on the premises;
and all such leases shall be understood to be for one year, unless it be stipulated to be for a shorter term." S. C. CODE,
§8806 (1942). Under this statute, it was held that an oral lease
for more than one year was effective for one year only and
thereafter continued on a month to month lease basis (unless,
of course, it ripened into a tenancy from year to year). Hillhouse v. Jennings, 60 S. C. 373, 38 S. E. 599 (1901) ; McNulty
v. Windham, 182 S. C. 462, 189 S. E. 754 (1936). However, it
should be noted that the new statute provides that a lease for
more than one year, and not in writing, shall be "void." This
means that it shall be a nullity, of no effect.
In Wright v. Ritz Theater Co., et al, 211 S. C. 161, 44 S. E.
2d 308 (1947), it was contended by the appellant that under
the new law an oral lease for one year was prohibited, unless
the tenant was in possession of the property or allowed to take
possession under the lease. In other words, by providing for
"a tenancy," the legislature, following the Supreme Court's
decision in Simon v. Kirkpatrick, supra, intended to exclude
an agreement and cover only an occupancy. This contention
was rejected by a majority of the court, although Chief Justice
Baker and Justice Stukes stated that they agreed with it. The
rejection was on the ground, primarily, that S. C. CODE, §88065 (Supp. 1946) also used the word "created," which implies
the lack of any previous relationship. The court also considered
the question from the practical point of view and said that the
instances where a landlord would permit a tenant to enter
into possession without some form of prior agreement would
be very rare indeed. At page 166:
"The practical side of the problem has influenced the
construction arrived at by the majority of the court. It
is common knowledge that most leases of real estate take
effect in the future. In only rare cases does the lessee take
possession simultaneously with the making of the lease.
It is unfair to infer that the legislature, with knowledge
of these facts, intended to make a parol lease for a term
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of one year enforceable only in the event that the lessee
was permitted by the landlord to enter into possession.
It would be almost like putting salt on a bird's tail in
order to capture it."
Since leases for one year or less, which give the tenant a renewal option, or which provide for continuance until notice
of termination is given, make the term one for more than one
year, they are considered leases for more than one year and
must be in writing. Hampton Park Terrace v. Sottile, supra,
and see Rainwater v. Hobeika, supra.
It seems to be well established that an oral lease for one
year or less does not have to be in writing even though it is
to commence in the future. Hillhouse v. Jennings, supra.
In the case of Nat'l Bank of S. C. v. Peoples Groc. Co.,
153 S. C. 118, 150 S. E. 478 (1929), it was held that the Statute
of Frauds provided that an oral lease agreement shall be ineffective except for leases of less than the term of one year
from the time of entry. Thus, the decisions in this state conform with the statutory provisions. It has been contended that
entry and rent payments are sufficient part performance to
take the case out of the Statute, but this question has never
been adjudicated in this state.
A covenant to repair need not be written, even though the
lease is in writing. It has several times been held that if a
written lease is silent on the subject, an oral agreement to
repair, or even to make alterations, will nevertheless be enforced, notwithstanding that a contemporaneous written lease
was also entered into. Williams v. Salmond, 79 S. C. 459, 61 S.
E. 79 (1908). At page 460:
"The parties may incorporate such contract to put
in repair or build new houses in the instrument that imbodies the lease contract, but it is not necessary for them
to do so."
Reardon v. Averbuck, 92 S. C. 569, 75 S. E. 959 (1912), at
page 571:
"....., it is true, as defendant contends, that a lease silent
on the subject of repairs implies no obligations on the
part of either lessor or lessee to repair; and as the written
lease in this case made no reference to repairs, it was no
obstacle to setting up and proving a distinct and separate
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agreement by Reardon, the plaintiff, to put the house in
repair." (Citing Williams v. Salmond, supra.)
In Mallardv. Duke, supra, it was contended that the leased
property became untentable by reason of the landlord's failure
to repair or to improve the property, pursuant to the oral
agreement, and that this "untenantability" constituted a constructive eviction. The court found that as a matter of fact
there was no agreement to repair or improve, but if there had
been, or if the property had become untenantable, there might
have been a constructive eviction, as the tenant was actually
in possession. Simon v. Kirkpatrick, supra; Port Utilities
Commission of Charleston v. Marine Oil Co., 173 S. C. 346,
175 S. E. 818 (1934).
RECORDING
The necessity for recording a lease for more than one year
of occupancy is illustrated by the old case of Page v. Street,
Speers Eq. 159 (1843). There, certain persons acquired a site
and erected a hotel. They incorporated the project under the
name of Charleston Hotel Co.; Mr. Page, under a written but
unrecorded lease, was to manage and operate the hotel for a
share in the profits. The very day that Mr. Page took over, the
famous Charleston fire occurred and the building was destroyed by fire. Upon its being rebuilt, a new agreement was
made with Mr. Page. In order to finance the rebuilding, it was
necessary for the owners to borrow the money, which they
secured by giving a mortgage on the building and the furnishings. Subsequently the enterprise failed, and the mortgagees
sought to foreclose and oust Mr. Page, and he attempted to enjoin the foreclosure and the ouster.
On the first hearing, Chancellor Harper held that he knew
of no requirement that Mr. Page record his lease agreement,
and since the mortgagee should have known that the hotel
was to be operated by someone, their claims were subordinate
to the rights of Mr. Page. However, on rehearing, the Chancellor found that he had been mistaken and gave judgment for
the mortgagee, saying at page 211:
"I am satisfied that the decree was erroneous, from
the circumstance of my having overlooked the Act of
Assembly of 1817, which provides, in very explicit terms,
'that all leases or contracts in writing, hereafter to be
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made between the landlord and tenant, for a longer term
than twelve months, shall not be valid in law, against the
rights and claims of third persons, unless the same shall
have been recorded in the office of Mesne Conveyances, at
least within three months from the time of the execution
thereof'."
Since that time, the law has been clear: a lease for more
than one year must be recorded. But "a lease for less than a
yearneed not be recorded." Ruff v. Columbia Railway Gas &
Electric Co., 109 S. C. 312, 96 S. E. 183 (1918). As to what
constitutes a lease for more than one year, we can probably
be guided by whether or not the lease needs be in writing. A
safe rule to follow is that if the law requires a lease to be
written, that lease should also be recorded.
But what about leases that are written but are not required by law so to be?
S. C. CODE, §8806-48 (Supp. 1946) provides that:

"In order to give notice to third persons any lease or
agreement for the use or occupancy of real estate shall be
recorded in the same manner as a deed of real estate."
However, in the Wright case, supra, it was held that a written
lease for one year did not have to be recorded, and one of the
convincing arguments used in reaching that conclusion was
that an oral agreement for one year was valid and, of course,
could not be recorded. As previously pointed out, in this state
an oral lease or agreement of lease for one year or less is
perfectly valid even though there is no contemporaneous
occupancy. Wright v. Ritz Theater Co., supra; Hillhouse v.
Jennings, supra; National Bank of South Carolinav. Peoples
Grocery Co., supra. Obviously, such a lease cannot be recorded.I
In the case of Barksdale v. Hinson, 212 S. C. 1, 46 S. E.
2d 170 (1948), the defendant on February 8, 1947, made an
oral lease with the landlord's agent for a period of one year.
Subsequently, on February 15th, 1947, the property was sold,
and shortly thereafter proceedings were brought by the purchaser to eject the defendant. The plaintiff contended that he
12. Record means to copy in an official county record book or to take
a picture of the document and file it in the official county records. See
S. C. CODE, §8893-2, 8893-2A (Supp. 1946).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol1/iss2/2

22

Bruton: Landlord and Tenant in South Carolina
REVIEW SECTION

had no notice of the tenancy and could not be bound thereby.
The court held that, since an oral agreement of lease for one
year was valid, then the above quoted S. C. CODE, §8806-48
(Supp. 1946) contemplated only written leases for more than
one year. Thus the court reconciled the above with S. C. CODE,
§8875 (1942), which was not repealed. The question might
well arise whether a written lease for one year should be recorded in order to give the purchaser notice, but the court's
discussion of the hardships that may result from permitting
ejection by purchasers without notice would indicate that
such lease need not be recorded. The court said at page 4:
"Respondent's contention is that the validity of a
parol lease does not extend to a 'third person' without
notice, but this is unreasonable in view of the ancient
and almost universal practice in this State of the creation
by parol of tenancies not exceeding one year of farm,
residential and business properties, which, of course,
need not be recorded in order to bind all persons dealing
with the property. Ruff v. Columbi&Ry., Gas & Electric
Co., 109 S. C. 312, 96 S. E. 183. It is well known that this
practice is particularly prevalent in the case of farm
tenancies. Under respondent's contention a tenant-farmer
under a verbal lease for one year might be ejected in the
midst of the crop growing season unless he were able to
prove actual notice of his right to a purchaser of the farm.
The custom is engrafted in the ways of our people by
reason of the validity from the earliest times of oral
leases for a year or less and there has naturally been no
statutory requirement of the recording such a lease. Code,
Sec. 8875 is expressly to the contrary of such requirement.
See the interesting first application in a reported case of
the statute relating to leases, enacted 1817, in Page v.
Street, Speers Eq. 159. Apparently before that there was
no authorization for the recording of a lease, however
long its term.
"Surely if it had been the legislative intent to upset
this long-established practice by the enactment of 1946
it would have been clearly and unmistakably expressed
and the applicable provision of the general recording
statute, Section 8875 of the Code of 1942, would have been
directly repealed. Reading the latter with the pertinent
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sections of the Act of 1946, which have been cited, it appears the recording of a lease or contract between landlord and tenant for a period not exceeding one year is still
unnecessary in order to bind a subsequent purchaser of
the property without notice, simply because it need not
be in writing."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Oxner said that possession
alone is sufficient to put the purchaser on notice, and that the
purchaser would have found, upon inquiring, that the tenant
was in possession under an oral lease for one year. He said
that the question should be left open as to whether a purchaser for value would be entitled to recover possession if, at
the time of the purchase, the tenant had not been in possession
of the demised property. This would affect oral leases for one
year with possession to be given in the future.1 3
What is a "third person" within the meaning of the statute? In First Presbyterian Church of York v. York Depository, 203 S. C. 410, 27 S. E. 2d 573 (1943), it was held that
the term should be construed with S. C. CODE, §8875 (1942) so
as to include only "subsequent creditors and purchasers for
valuable consideration without notice" and that it did not include devisees. In Gentry v. Recreation Inc., supra, it was
held that an unrecorded lease was not effective against a subsequent chattel mortgagee.
What about a lease for one year, which is to continue from
year to year unless notice of termination is given? Since this
provision of continuance is quite customary, it would be expected that this question has been decided. And so it has.
In Hampton Park Terrace, Inc. v. Sottile, supra, it was held
that such a lease is one for more than a year and needs to be
written and recorded. At page 376:
"This lease provides for a lease for one year which is
to continue from year to year unless either landlord or
tenant shall give six months' notice of an intention to
terminate it. If the lease had provided for a renewal at
13. Of course we are discussing only the effect on Landlord and
Tenant by failure to record a lease. While a lease for one year or less
would not have to be recorded and would not permit eviction of the
tenant, such a lease would probably be a breach of warranty, if no notice
of it were given, permitting a purchaser to rescind a purchase of property which he desired and contracted for immediate occupancy.
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the end of the year by the act of the parties, then it might
have been contended, with much force, that the lease ex..
pired by its own limitation at the end of the year, and,
therefore, the notice required was an agreement to make
a new contract on the same terms. This lease required
notice to terminate it, and without the intervention of
the acts of the parties, the lease should continue indefinitely from year to year, and the parties would act under
it, not by virtue of a renewal, but by the continued obligations of the original lease. The lease is, therefore, a lease
for more than a year. It was such a lease as is required
by law to be recorded, and not being recorded is void as to
the excess over the year, as to the subsequent purchaser
for value."
This case also held that a lease agreement which should be
recorded was nevertheless effective as a one year lease. Also at
page 376:
"The lease was not absolutely void for all purposes.
It was good as a parol lease for one year."
REMEDIES
The statute provides for the eviction of the tenant for
failing to pay rent, S. C. CODE, §8806-14 (Supp. 1946), or
upon termination of the tenancy, S. C. CODE, §8806-10 (Supp.
1946). The statute also provides that if the tenant is "wrongfully disposessed" he may recover damages from landlord.
These sections read:
"The tenant may be ejected upon application of the
landlord or his agent when such tenant fails or refuses to
pay the rent when demanded, or when the term of tenancy
or occupancy has ended, or when the terms or conditions
of the lease have been violated." S. C. CODE, §8806-17
(Supp. 1946).
"In case any tenant is wrongfully dispossessed, he, she
or they may have action for damages against the landlord." S. C. CODE, §8806-29 (Supp. 1946).
In Williams v. Columbia Mills Co., 100 S. C. 363, 85 S. E.
160 (1915), an action was brought under S. C. CODE, §3509
(1912) for actual and punitive damages by a tenant who
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claimed that he had been "wrongfully dispossessed" by the'
defendant-landlord. The landlord defended on the grounds
that he had proceeded under the statute to evict the plaintiff'
and had obtained an order from the local magistrate. It was
held that the tenant was estopped to claim that he had been
"wrongfully dispossessed" so long as the landlord acted under
an order of the magistrate's court. In effect, the decision prevents the matter from being tried de novo. The court said at
page 370:
"The findings of the magistrate in ejectment proceedings is a judgment in those proceedings, and it cannot be'
attacked collaterally in this or any other case. Of course
this does not refer to an abuse of process after judgment,
but those facts that would have prevented the issuance of
the warrant of ejectment should have been set up in those
proceedings. The respondent in this case is bound as long
as those proceedings stand."
In Trakas v. Mitchell, 111 S. C. 160, 97 S. E. 245 (1918), it
was held that an eviction could not be enjoined. Although the
court did not so state, apparently one reason for its decision
was that an action to recover damages for eviction could be
maintained.
Since the action cannot be brought as long as an order of
the magistrate permits the eviction, and since legal eviction
can only be brought in the Magistrate's Court, presumably the
statute will permit such an action only where all of the following circumstances exist: (a) the tenant is dispossessed by an
order of the magistrate; (b) the order is appealed by the tenant; (c) the tenant does not stay the eviction pending the appeal, and is actually evicted; and (d) the eviction order of the
magistrate is reversed on the appeal.
While the statute does not give an action for a wrongful
distraint, apparently a suit for conversion will lie. In Salley v.
Parker,112 S. C. 109, 98 S. E. 847 (1917), the landlord issued
a distraint for rent in arrears, although in fact the rent had
been paid to date. Under the distraint the landlord seized and
sold a stove belonging to the tenant. He was held liable to the
tenant for the conversion of the stove.
Under the new statute, a distraint is issued by the magistrate, upon the filing of an affidavit by the landlord that the
rent is in arrears. Presumably, since no statutory appeal is
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:allowed, an unlawful or improper distraint could be the subject of an action, as in the Salley case, supra, even though it
is issued by the magistrate instead of by the landlord.
DESTRUCTION OF SUBJECT MATTER OF LEASE

What happens when there is a complete or partial destruction of the subject matter of the lease? At common law, apparently, the destruction of the leased property was just the
-tenant's hard luck. He had to continue to pay rent until the
end of the year. Civil law was more favorable to the tenant,
:and there was an apportionment of the rent between the period
when the tenant could enjoy the use of the property' and the
period when he could not.
In this state, one of the earliest cases involving the prin.ciple was Bacot v. Parnell, 2 Bail. 424 (1831), where a slave
-who had been rented died during the period when he was
under the lease contract. It was held that the rent should not
continue after his death, as that was an act of God. In Bayly v.
Lawrence, 1 Bay 499 (1792), the defendant had rented a ship-yard from the plaintiff for ten years. In an action to recover
unpaid rent, the defense was that the property had been held
'by the British during the War of 1776. In holding for the
defendant, the court said at page 499:
"That the defendant ought to pay for the time he
peaceably enjoyed the premises, but not for any time he
was prevented by the casualties of war."
In Ripley v. Wightman, 4 McC. 447 (1828), it was held
that a tenant was relieved from paying the entire rent by the
destruction of the leased residence by storm. At page 449:
"If a man leases a house for a year, and during the
term it is rendered untenantable by a storm the rent ought
to be apportioned according to the time it was occupied".
There the purpose of the leasehold, which was to provide
the tenant with a residence, had been destroyed by the destruction of the building.
As a result of these decisions it was generally stated that
this state followed the civil law instead of the common law
in this respect. However, in the leading case of Coogan v.
Parker, 2 S. C. 255, 16 Am. Rep. 659 (1870), all statements
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that this state followed civil instead of the common law were
expressly repudiated. There the court fully discussed all of
the cases which had theretofore been decided at common law
on this question. To explain the common law cases in other
jurisdictions, which seemingly were inconsistent with prior
South Carolina decisions, the court drew a distinction between
loss of the leased property and loss of the subject matter of
the lease. The court also carefully distinguished between loss
of the subject matter of the lease by reason of fire, and loss by
the reason of an act of God or action of the enemy. It was said
that loss by fire should be excluded as grounds for cancellation of the lease for two primary reasons: (a) it is an "ordinary risk that may fairly have been considered within the contemplations of the parties," and (b) "an unscrupulous tenant,
with a hard bargain, would find himself tempted to destroy the
premises secretly in order to escape the payment of rent."
The distinction between a physical destruction of the leased
property and a destruction of the subject matter of the lease
was needed to explain the many English and other common
law states' decisions. Also it enabled the court to distinguish
between leases in cities and towns, and leases in the country:
that is, where the land was an important part of the lease and
where it was not. The court said that if a tenant leases a building for a dwelling house in a city, it would be unfair to require him to continue to pay rent if the house is destroyed because "a few feet of barren land" remains. On the other hand,
the dwelling house is not so important in a country lease. The
court said at page 275:
"If parties contract with reference to the occupation of
a dwelling house, the destruction of that dwelling house
is clearly the destruction of that which they had in view,
and was the basis and consideration of their contract.
To say that the few feet of barren land on which it stood,
incapable of any production worthy of consideration, is
sufficient to answer the intention of the parties, to satisfy
the justice and equity of the contract, as well as its terms,
is to say what no jurist has yet ventured broadly to
affirm. The only difference between leases in compactly
built cities and in the country is, that, in the one case, the
principle is more clear and evident in its application than
in the other. The ground of distinction must be the fact
that the structure bears such relation, in point of fitness
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and value for the use contemplated by the lease, as to give
rise to the conclusion that the buildings were the main
element of the consideration on which the agreement to
pay rent was based."
The decision is of vast importance in this state; not only
for giving vigor to the doctrine of impossibility of performance, but even more in indicating a liberal tendency in permitting the rescission of leases which, because of circumstances beyond the control of the tenant, make the lease burdensome to him. The court made this important statement
also on page 275:
"It has long been felt that the application of the common law ought to yield results more in accordance with
the habits and ideas of the people, in this respect, and it
is apprehended that, if approached in a constructive as
well as a critical spirit, its doctrine and principles will
be found, in all respects, compatible with the growth and
tendencies of the civilization which has been fostered by
it."
The principle also was applied in the case of Huguenin v.
Courtenay, 21 S. C.403 (1884). There, the plaintiff sued for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of a leasehold of
land. A heavy storm had washed away about one-half of the
lot formerly, and, at the time of the contract of sale, a part
of the leasehold. In holding for the defendant, the court announced that in this state where there is a substantial destruction of the subject matter in a lease for years, by an act of
God or the public enemy, the tenant or purchaser may elect
to rescind and shall be discharged from the payment of rent
or fulfillment of the contract.
There are many situations where a "destruction of the
subject matter of the lease" may occur without a physical
destruction of the leased property. Thus, in the Coogan case,
supra, the property leased was a store building which was to
be used as a restaurant. The building was not destroyed, but
it was in the area occupied by Federal troops and the tenant
could not operate the restaurant there for some time. An exception to the doctrine of impossibility of performance is that
the other party to the contract must not contribute to the
cause of the impossibility. Indeed, some cases have gone even
further and have required the other party to cooperate; how-
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ever, where it is held that there is a "duty to cooperate," apparently no affirmative action is required. In the famou8 case
of Lansdowne v. Reihrnann, 124 S. W. 353 (Ky. App. 1910),
it was held that the lessor-owner was not required to sign a
petition to permit the leased property to be operated as a
saloon, although he knew at the time of the lease that the
tenant intended to use the property as a saloon and that it
would be necessary for him to obtain the requisite number of
signatures on the petition.
The essence of the doctrine of impossibility of performance
is an absolute destruction of the subject matter of the lease
for the term. In the Lansdowne case, supra, the property could
be used for a saloon upon obtaining the necessary signatures
to a petition. If property should be leased for a swimming
pool and subsequently the water should, without fault of the
tenant, become irremediably contaminated, it would seem
grounds for rescission would exist.
There are apparently no decisions on the question of
whether grounds for rescission exist when the condition creating the impossibility is caused by an ordinance or a health
or a safety rule, and could be removed by a substantial alteration in the leased property. The amount required to be spent
for such alteration might be greater than what the property
is worth to the landlord or tenant. Could the one who by law
is required to make the alteration, avoid doing so by cancelling
the lease? There is no decision on this question, but the opiniop1 of the Supreme Court in Coogan v. Parker,supra, would
indicate that under such circumstances the lease could be cancelled.
Another essential for invoking the doctrine is the lack of
knowledge, actual or constructive, by the parties of the fact or
circumstances creating the impossibility. Thus, if the destruction of the subject matter of the lease is caused by a restriction
of record, a zoning restriction, or ordinance regarding health,
safety or fire, or any other matter in existence, or so within
the realm of possibility that it should have been thought of by
reasonable men when the lease was made, it would not give
grounds for cancellation or rescission.
CONCLUSION
This state in the past decade has changed from a predominantly agricultural one to a predominantly industrial and
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commercial one. Thus the reason for the old annual tenancy
rule has vanished. The legislative change in this respect was
therefore essential. While the change in the law would undoubtedly have evolved under the principle of the decision in
Coogan v. Parker, supra, nevertheless the principle had become so firmly embedded in our law that the change by the
judiciary would probably have been slow and gradual. For
this reason it was much better that the rule be changed by the
legislature than wait for the judiciary to act. But in all other
respects, except purely formal requirements such as that a
lease for more than one year must be in writing and that a
lease must be recorded, etc., the necessary change can be
brought about through the judiciary. Coogan v. Parkerpermits judicial recognition of changed conditions and permits a
rule of law based upon reason.
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